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A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 AS A SOURCE OF THE
ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
by Gregory E. Maggs*

I. Introduction
The records of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 are often cited in
support of claims about the original meaning of the Constitution.1 These records
consist of an official journal of the proceedings, notes taken by participants at the
Convention, preliminary drafts of the Constitution, and various other documents.2
Despite the frequency of their citation, working with these sources is difficult, and
most law schools provide little training in their use. Accordingly, judges, lawyers,
law clerks, law students, and legal academics may feel uncomfortable in relying on
the records or in assessing arguments made by others about what the records
might show. The purpose of this essay is to provide helpful guidance on this
subject.3

Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. This essay was
presented at a Symposium Commemorating the 100th Anniversary of Farrand’s Records of
the Federal Convention sponsored by the George Washington Law Review and the Institute
for Constitutional History on November 3-4, 2011. I am very grateful to the other
speakers and the members of the audience who provided me with helpful guidance and
advice.

*

1

See infra part III.A (describing how cases and law review articles have cited the records).

See infra part II.D (identifying the known records of the Convention). Most of the records
are collected in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS], a 3-volume work cited throughout this essay. A further
description of this work and supplements to it appears in part II.D.
2

For similar guides concerning the records of the state ratifying conventions and the
Federalist Papers, see Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to The Records of the State
Ratifying Conventions as a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 457, and Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a
Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801 (2007).
3
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The essay first describes the Constitutional Convention and the various
kinds of records that were kept of its proceedings.4 The essay then explains, with
examples, how judicial opinions and academic works draw upon the records for
evidence of the Constitution’s original meaning, including both the meaning that
the Framers may have subjectively intended the document to have and also other
possible meanings.5 The essay next identifies and assesses seven important
potential grounds for impeaching assertions about what the records show.6 Each
of these potential grounds has merit in some contexts, but all of them are also
subject to significant limitations or counter arguments. The essay, accordingly,
recommends that anyone making or evaluating claims about the original meaning
of the Constitution should proceed with caution, carefully taking into account
both the possible grounds for impeaching claims and the arguments against these
grounds. Appendices to this essay include an annotated bibliography and a table
of the deputies who participated at the Constitutional Convention. 7
This essay does not address the important question of whether or to what
extent courts today should be bound to follow the original meaning of the
Constitution. Other works, of course, discuss this issue in great detail.8 This
essay simply assumes that lawyers, judges, and scholars may be interested in
knowing what the records reveal about the original meaning of the Constitution
regardless of the extent to which they consider this meaning to control modern
constitutional interpretation.
II. The Convention and the Records of the Convention
A. Calling the Convention

4

See infra part II.

5

See infra part III.

6

See infra part IV.

7

See infra appendices A (annotated bibliography) & B (table of deputies).

Classic works arguing that judges should follow the original meaning of the Constitution
include RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional
Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631 (1993); and Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). Classic works expressing the opposite view include
Boris I. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The Recent Past, 77
CAL. L. REV. 235 (1989); and H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
8
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Between 1781 and 1789, the United States was joined in union by the
Articles of Confederation.9 The Articles of Confederation established a unicameral
Congress consisting of representatives from all thirteen states.10 The Articles gave
this Congress limited powers,11 but otherwise recognized that “[e]ach state retains
its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and
right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated.”12 The functioning of
the Union under the Articles of Confederation was not entirely successful, and by
1786 deteriorating economic conditions in the United States had become a subject
of great concern. Much of the blame lay at the feet of burdensome state commerce
regulations.13 At the suggestion of James Madison, the state of Virginia invited all
of the other states to send representatives to a convention in Annapolis, Maryland,
to discuss these conditions.14 Virginia further proposed that the convention write
a report to Congress regarding possible changes to the Articles of Confederation to
ameliorate the situation.15
The Annapolis Convention met in September 1786, but did not achieve its
intended goals.16 Only five of the thirteen states sent commissioners.17 They were
too few in number to make any useful recommendations regarding commerce or
See 1 JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A COMPREHENSIVE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 33-34 (2005) (describing the Articles of
Confederation).
9

10

See Articles of Confederation art. V.

11

See id. art. IX.

12

Id. art. II.

Alexander Hamilton explained: “The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some
States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just
cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this
nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they
became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to
the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy.” THE FEDERALIST No. 22,
at 130 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).

13

Resolution of the General Assembly of Virginia Proposing a Joint Meeting of
Commissioners From the States to Consider and Recommend a Federal Plan for
Regulating Commerce, Jan. 21, 1786, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF
THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 38 (Charles C. Tansill ed. 1927) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION].
14

15

See id.

16

See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 19-21 (2005) (describing the Annapolis Convention).

1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES iv (Joseph
Gales ed. 1834) [hereinafter Annals of Congress]

17
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other subjects.18 The Articles of Confederation required unanimous approval of
every state for any changes,19 and the commissioners properly worried that the
states who had not sent representatives later might disagree with their
recommendations. Before disbanding, however, the commissioners took one
extremely important action. Finding “important defects in the system of the
Federal Government,”20 they at the Annapolis Convention proposed that each
state send representatives to another convention to be held the following year.
This second convention, they urged, should:
meet at Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next, to take into
consideration the situation of the United States, to devise such
further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the
constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of
the Union.21
Congress acted on this suggestion by calling for a second convention “for
the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and
reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions
therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render
the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government & the
preservation of the Union.”22 This second convention became known as the
Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787.
The Convention met in Philadelphia on a total of 79 days between May 14,
1787, and September 17, 1787.23 During this time, the Convention departed from
the mission that Congress had given it. The Convention did not simply draft
“alterations” for the Articles of Confederation as amendments. Instead, it
proposed an entirely new Constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation.

18

See id.

19

See Articles of Confederation, art. XIII.

Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government, Sept. 14,
1786, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION, supra note 14, at 42.
20

21

Id.

Report of Proceedings in Congress, Feb. 21, 1787, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE
FORMATION, supra note 14, at 44. Some of the states sent deputies under different
instructions.
22

The Convention did not meet (1) on Sundays; (2) between May 15 and May 24; (3) on
July 3 or 4; and (4) between July 27 and Aug 5. See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 77.

23
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The Convention did not ask Congress or the state legislatures to approve the
proposed Constitution. Instead, perhaps fearing delay and possible defeat, the
Convention called for separate ratifying conventions to be held in each state.24
Although this arrangement stripped Congress and the state legislatures of some
power, they did not block the procedure.
B. Deputies Attending the Constitutional Convention of 1787
The states each were free to send multiple “deputies”25 to the Constitutional
Convention. At the Convention, however, each state only had one vote.26 In total,
fifty-five men attended the Convention.27 These men represented all of the states
except Rhode Island, which chose not to participate.
Many of the deputies arrived late. In fact, although the Convention was
scheduled to begin on May 14, 1787, a quorum did not gather until May 25,
1787.28 Participants continued to trickle in after that. The deputies from New
Hampshire were the tardiest, first arriving on July 23, 1787.29 In addition, some
deputies exited before the close of the Convention. As described more fully below,
deputies from Maryland and New York departed because they opposed
abandoning the Articles of Confederation.

See U.S. Const. art. VII (specifying the ratification process). Rufus King of
Massachusetts said that he favored presenting the Constitution to ratifying conventions
rather than state legislatures because “[t]he Legislatures . . . being to lose power, will be
most likely to raise objections.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 123 (Madison's
Notes, Jun. 5, 1787) (statement of Rufus King).
24

Some sources, including some Supreme Court cases, informally refer to the
representatives as “delegates” rather than “deputies.” See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 674 (1984). But “deputies” is a more accurate term. The states gave credentials
(i.e., written statements of authority) to their representatives. These credentials typically
described the representatives as “deputies.” See, e.g., Credentials of the Members of the
Federal Convention, State of Georgia, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION, supra
note 14, at 82. In addition, the official journal of the Convention uses the term “deputy” to
describe the representatives. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 1 (Journal,
May 25, 1787). In addition, when George Washington signed the Constitution, he
identified himself as the “Presidt and deputy from Virginia” at the Convention. U.S. Const.
signatures.

25

26

See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 11 (Madison’s Notes, May 28, 1787).

27

See infra Appendix B (listing deputies).

28

See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 1 (Journal, May 25, 1787).

29

See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 84 (Journal, May 23, 1787).
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At the end of the Convention, thirty-eight deputies signed the
Constitution.30 One deputy also signed for an absent colleague.31 Three others
who were present decided not to sign the Constitution either because they
opposed its provisions or because they wanted to reserve judgment.32
In general, the deputies were a distinguished group. Historian Richard B.
Lewis has tallied their remarkable political accomplishments:
Three had been in the Stamp Act Congress, seven in the First
Continental Congress.
Eight had signed the Declaration of
Independence, and two, the Articles of Confederation. Two would
become President, one Vice President, and two Chief Justices of the
Supreme Court. Sixteen had been or would later hold State
governorships. Forty-two at one time or another had sat in one or
another of the Continental Congresses, while at least 30 were
Revolutionary War veterans.33
Some of the deputies participated more actively than others in framing the
Constitution. Accordingly, time and again, the names of a select few of these
deputies appear in the records of the Convention. These important deputies fall
into seven groups: the grand eminences, the visionaries, the conciliators, the
dissenters, the disappointed, the unsure, and the absent.
The grand eminences were George Washington and Benjamin Franklin.
George Washington came as a deputy from Virginia and presided over the
Convention, except when it sat as a committee of the whole.34 Having kept the
Army together throughout the war, and led it to victory, he was widely viewed as
the greatest living American. Although he participated substantively only once in
the debates,35 his presence had great importance because it gave prestige and
dignity to the entire enterprise.

30

See U.S. Const. signatures.

George Read of Delaware also signed for his absent colleague John Dickinson. See 3
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 587.
31

These deputies were Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, George Mason of Virginia, and
Edmund Randolph of Virginia. See id. at 588-590.
32

33

RICHARD B. LEWIS, FRAMING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 45 (1979).

Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts presided when the Convention met as a Committee
of the Whole. See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 110. The Convention may have selected
Gorham for this role to provide the northern states a position of authority. See id.

34

35

On the last day of the Convention, after mentioning that he had not previously spoken,

6

Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania was the oldest of the deputies, and was
widely acclaimed as the most learned. In addition to his great fame as a scientist,
inventor, and publisher, Franklin was easily the most experienced diplomat and
statesman in America. Among his many other accomplishments, Franklin had
helped draft and had signed the Declaration of Independence, he had proposed
the Articles of Confederation, and he had negotiated the Treaty of Alliance with
France and the Treaty of Paris with Britain.36 At the Convention, Franklin made
several very significant speeches.37
The visionaries were the deputies who had the strongest and best
articulated ideas about the kind of government that the United States should
have. First among these men was James Madison. Madison inspired what was
called the Virginia Plan for the government (discussed below) and opposed other
plans.38 Madison also attended every day of the Convention, spoke on most
topics, and kept the most comprehensive and accurate notes.39
Second among these visionaries was arguably James Wilson of
Pennsylvania. Wilson had the most democratic prescription for the new
government. He favored direct election of the President. He also supported
popular election of the House of Representatives.40 Wilson criticized the decision
to limit Congress's power to restrict the importation of slaves,41 and he also
supported the restriction on state interference with contracts.42
Other visionaries included William Paterson (sometimes spelled Patterson) of
New Jersey, Alexander Hamilton of New York, and Gouverneur43 Morris of
Washington urged his colleagues to change the representation in the House from not more
than 1 in 40,000 to not more than 1 in 30,000. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2,
at 644 (Madison’s Notes, Sep. 17, 1787).
36

See 2 VILE, supra note 9, at 616.

37

See id.

38

See 2 VILE, supra note 9, at 816.

See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at xv-xix (discussing Madison's participation in
the Convention and note taking).

39

40

Id. at 49 (Madison’s Notes, May 31, 1787).

41

See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 372 (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 22, 1787).

42

Id. at 440 (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 28, 1787).

Gouverneur Morris’s unusual first name has a simple explanation; he was named after
his mother, whose maiden name was Sarah Gouverneur. 20 THE NEW YORK GENEALOGICAL
AND BIOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY, THE NEW YORK GENEALOGICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL RECORD 23
(1889). Gouverneur Morris held many political positions, but was never the “governor” of
43
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Pennsylvania.
Paterson proposed the New Jersey Plan for the national
government (discussed below), which would have benefited small states by giving
all states equal representation in a unilateral legislature.44 Hamilton proposed his
own plan, which would have created a strong federal government with an
executive elected for life.45 The plan greatly would have reduced state sovereignty
by allowing the national executive to appoint executives for each state
government. Based on the records, it appears that Gouverneur Morris spoke more
than any other delegate.46 He persuaded James Randolph to change the first
resolution of the Virginia plan to say that the national government should have
separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches.47 This resolution not only
established the basic structure of the new government, but also made clear that
the Convention was going to do more than merely amend the Articles of
Confederation. Recognized as a master of elegant expression, Morris also did most
of the final stylistic editing of the Constitution.48
The principal conciliator was Roger Sherman of Connecticut. Sherman
proposed the “Great Compromise” (also known as the “Connecticut Compromise”)
adopted by the Convention, under which each state would have equal
representation in the Senate and proportional representation in the House.49
Sherman also assisted others in preparing the Committee of Detail’s draft of the
Constitution.50 Although described above as a grand eminence, Benjamin
Franklin deserves additional recognition as a conciliator. In late June, when the
debates became particularly contentious over the states’ representation in
Congress, Franklin proposed that the Convention institute the practice of
beginning each session as a prayer as a way of overcoming their differences:

any state.
3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 611-614 (reprinting The New Jersey Plan or
Paterson Resolutions).

44

45

Id. at 617-630 (reprinting the Hamilton Plan).

46

2 VILE, supra note 9, at 496.

1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 33 (Madison’s Notes, May 30, 1787). The
Committee of the Whole passed this resolution shortly afterward. See id. at 35 (Madison’s
Notes, May 30, 1787).
47

48

See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 108-109.

Sherman proposed the compromise on June 11, 1787. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 2, at 196 (Madison’s Notes, June 11, 1787). The Convention adopted the compromise
on July 16, 1787. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 15 (Madison’s Notes, July
16, 1787).

49

50

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 97 (Journal, Jul. 24, 1787).

8

I therefore beg leave to move—that henceforth prayers imploring the
assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held
in this Assembly every morning before we proceed to business, and
that one or more of the Clergy of this City be requested to officiate in
that service.51
In addition, at the close of the Convention, Franklin urged the deputies to put
aside their disagreements with particular provisions of the draft and sign the
Constitution. In a now famous speech, he said:
[T]he older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and
to pay more respect to the judgment of others. . . . I cannot help
expressing a wish that every member of the Convention who may still
have objections to it, would with me, on this occasion doubt a little of
his own infallibility—and to make manifest our unanimity, put his
name to this instrument.52
The dissenters were the deputies who adamantly opposed the work of the
Convention. Robert Yates and John Lansing, Jr., both of New York, left the
Convention on July 10, 1787. 53 They believed that their instructions did not
permit them to participate in creating a new Constitution.54 Their departure had a
significant effect. It left Alexander Hamilton as the sole deputy remaining from
New York. Afterwards, Hamilton did not vote on questions before the Convention
because he could not by himself represent New York’s delegation.55 Accordingly,
New York effectively had no formal voice in the proceedings after July 10.

1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 452 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 28, 1787) (statement
of Benjamin Franklin).

51

52

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 642-643

53

See 2 JOHN R. VILE, supra note 9, at 852-83.

54

See id.

The Convention adopted a rule permitting a state to vote only when “fully represented.”
See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 8 (Journal, May 28, 1787). This rule prevented
Hamilton from voting on behalf of New York, but did not prevent him from speaking. At
the close of the Convention, Hamilton signed the Constitution as a witness that the
Convention was acting with the “unanimous consent of the states present.” U.S. Const.
signatures. This affirmation was true; although New York did not consent, it was not
“present” after Lansing and Yates departed, and therefore the Constitution was approved
with the unanimous consent of the states present, an event that Hamilton witnessed.
55
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Two other dissenters, Luther Martin and John Frances Mercer, came from
Maryland. Martin wanted the Constitution to preserve state equality.56 He also
proposed the language that later became the Supremacy Clause as an alternative
to a proposal that would have allowed Congress to veto state legislation.57 Mercer
was concerned that the Constitution did not sufficiently preserve state
sovereignty.58 Both men left the Convention before its conclusion and later
opposed its ratification in Maryland.59
The disappointed included two deputies who stayed to the end of the
Convention, but refused to sign the Constitution: George Mason of Virginia and
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts. Although the details of their objections remain
debated, both men generally worried that the Constitution would not protect
individual liberty.60 Mason also predicted that the issue of slavery would cause
great trouble for the nation.61
Edmund J. Randolph of Virginia was famously unsure. He made two great
contributions to the Convention. First, he formally proposed the Virginia Plan.62
Second, while preparing the initial draft of the Constitution for the Committee of
Detail, Randolph decided to “insert essential principles only”63 and to “use simple
and precise language and generl propositions.”64 These decisions did much to give
the Constitution its enduring quality. Ultimately, however, Randolph did not sign
the Constitution because he was unsure of its merits.65

See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 324 (recording that Martin “could never
accede to a plan that would introduce inequality”).

56

57

See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 29 (Madison’s Notes, Jul. 17, 1787).

For example, Mercer and Luther both believed that state consent should be necessary
before Congress introduce any federal force into a state. See 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra
note 2, at 317 (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 17, 1787).

58

59

See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 450, 477.

See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 646-47 (Madison, Sept. 17, 1787) (describing
Gerry’s objections); id. at 649 (noting Mason’s refusal to sign).

60

61

See id.

62

1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 20 (Madison’s Notes, May 29, 1787).

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 137 & n.6 (quoting a document found among
George Mason’s papers).

63

64

Id.

65

Id. at 644, 646, 649 (Madison’s Notes, Sept. 17, 1787).
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The absent included men whom the states had appointed to serve as
deputies, but who did not attend the Convention. These absentees included
famous figures such as Richard Henry Lee, Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson,
John Adams, Samuel Adams, John Hancock, and others.66
C. What Happened at the Convention
For ease of understanding what happened at the Constitutional Convention,
the proceedings might be divided into seven chronological segments which each
involved significant events:
1. Period of May 14-29, 1787: The Deputies establish the rules and
procedures of the Convention.
Although the Convention was to start on May 14, 1787, no business took
place until a quorum was gathered on May 25, 1787.67 On that day, the deputies
began their work by making important decisions about how they would proceed.
They unanimously selected George Washington to serve as the Convention’s
president.68 They then adopted rules governing the proceedings. These rules
specified, among other things, that each state present and fully represented would
have one vote;69 that the proceedings would be kept secret;70 and that the
Convention could reconsider items already voted on.71
On May 29, 1787, Edmund Randolph offered 15 resolutions, each just one
sentence in length.72 These resolutions—which became known as the “Virginia
Plan” for government—reflected the ideas of James Madison.73 Under the Virginia
Plan, the legislature would have two chambers, one directly elected by the people
and the other nominated by the state legislatures.74 The Plan generally favored
66

See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 223.

67

See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 3 (Madison’s Notes, May 25, 1787).

68

See id.

69

See id. at 11 (Madison’s Notes, May 28, 1787).

70

See id. at 15 (Madison’s Notes, May 28, 1787).

71

See id. at 16 (same).

72

See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 20-22 (Madison, May 29, 1787).

73

See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 816.

See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 20 (“3. Resd. that the National Legislature
ought to consist of two branches. 4. Resd. that the members of the first branch of the
National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States . . . . 5. Resold.
that the members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by

74
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the states with large populations (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, and
Virginia) because it called for proportional representation in both houses.75 After
Randolph made this proposal, the Convention decided to meet as a “Committee of
the Whole” to deliberate over the Plan.76 A committee of the whole is a committee
that consists of all of the members of a deliberative body who are present.77 A
committee of the whole is typically used by an assembly for initial drafting of
documents because its more flexible rules facilitate discussion.
2. Period of May 30-June 19: The Committee of the Whole considers the
Virginia Plan, the New Jersey Plan, the Hamilton Plan, and other
fundamental matters.
From May 30 to June 19, the deputies primarily met as a Committee of the
Whole. On the first day when meeting as a Committee of the Whole, Gouverneur
Morris urged James Randolph to modify his resolutions to include the following
proposal: “Resolved, that a national government (ought to be established)
consisting of a supreme Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary.”78 The Committee
of the Whole voted to adopt this resolution the same day.79 With this action, the
Committee of the Whole implicitly endorsed creating a new Constitution as the
goal of the Convention, rather than merely amending the Articles of Confederation.
The deputies principally debated the Virginia Plan on June 13 and 14.80 In
this debate, the small states opposed the Virginia Plan because they believed that
it eliminated state equality.81 Following debate on the competing plans, the
Committee of the Whole agreed on many ideas that made their way into the final
version of the Constitution: a single executive, a supreme court and inferior courts
created by Congress, a requirement that Congress guarantee the states a
republican form of government, a requirement that members of state governments
swear to uphold the Constitution, and a plan for states to ratify the Constitution
those of the first, out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual
Legislatures . . . .”).
75

See id.

76

See id. at 23.

77

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ___ (9th ed. 2009).

1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 33 (Madison’s Notes, May 30, 1787) (emphasis in
original).

78

79

See id. at 35 (Madison’s Notes, May 30, 1787).

80

See id. at 232-237, 240 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 13 & 14, 1787).

81

See id.
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in state ratifying conventions. These ideas were summarized in a report that was
to be returned to the full Convention.82 Following the preparation of this report,
William Patterson of New Jersey and Alexander Hamilton of New York
subsequently proposed their alternative plans for the government,83 both of which
are discussed above.
3. Period of June 20-July 24: The Convention agrees to the Great Compromise
and other Matters.
During the period from June 20 to July 23, the deputies ceased meeting as
a committee of the whole and met in full convention. Important debates about
representation in the legislative branch followed. The large and small states
initially could not agree on the composition of the legislative branch. Ultimately, a
modified version of the Virginia plan became acceptable to the Convention after
the deputies agreed to what has become known as the “Great Compromise” (or
alternatively as the “Connecticut Compromise”). In this compromise, the states
would have equal representation in the Senate, while the House would have
proportional representation.84 This compromise balanced the interests of large
and small states. The Convention as part of this compromise adopted the 3/5ths
rule, under which only 3/5ths of the slave populations would be counted for
determining representation in the House.
In addition to the Great Compromise, the Convention at this time also
addressed a variety of other important topics. They agreed, for example, that
federal laws would be supreme over state laws,85 that judges would be appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the second branch of the
legislature,86 and the federal government would guarantee that each state had a
82

See id. at 235-237.

See id. at 242 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 15, 1787) (introduction of Paterson’s Plan); id. at
291 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 18, 1787) (introduction of Hamilton’s Plan).
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republican form of government.87 On July 23, 1787, with the general structure of
the government settled, the Full Convention created a “Committee of Detail” to
turn the plan into an initial draft of the Constitution.88 The Full Convention
recessed shortly afterward and waited for the Committee of Detail to perform its
work.89
4. Period of July 24-August 5: The Committee of Detail prepares a draft of the
Constitution.
The Committee of Detail met from July 24 to August 5, with Edmund
Randolph and James Wilson doing most of the drafting.90 The goal of the
Committee was to put all of the matters approved by the Convention into the form
of a constitution. When the Committee of Detail had finished its work, it had
produced a draft containing 23 articles.91 The draft produced was a cross between
a list of resolutions and a document that looks like our current Constitution. It
sent to a printer for distribution to all of the deputies.92 In addition to describing
the new Congress and the selection of its members, the Committee of Detail added
the list of the congressional powers and the list of the limitations on state
legislation.93
5. Period of August 6-September 8: The Convention debates aspects of the
Report of the Committee of Detail.
From August 6 to September 8, the Full Convention debated the Committee
of Detail’s draft and other important matters. They considered among many other
questions topics such as limiting suffrage to property owners,94 the problems of
slavery,95 and the need for each state to give full faith and credit to acts of the
others.96 During this time, the Convention referred some matters to separate
committees, which met and reported back to the Convention. After reaching final
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conclusions on most items, the Convention appointed a “Committee of Style and
Arrangement” to prepare a draft putting the Constitution in a consistent and near
final form.97
6. Period of September 8-12: The Committee of Style and Arrangements
prepares a near final draft of the Constitution
From September 8 to 12, the Committee of Style and Arrangement, acting
on the Convention’s decision, prepared a near final version of the Constitution.98
Gouverneur Morris did much of the work, although the Committee also included
James Madison, William Johnson, Rufus King, and Alexander Hamilton.99 A
printer made copies of the Committee’s draft for all of the deputies.100 The
Committee of Style had no authorization to alter the meaning of the
Constitution.101 But this does not mean that the Committee’s revisions are to be
ignored. In Nixon v. United States,102 the Supreme Court considered the phrase in
Article I, section 2 giving the Senate “the sole power to try impeachments.”103 The
petitioner argued that the word “sole” had no substantive meaning because it was
a “cosmetic edit” added by the Committee of Style.104 The Supreme Court rejected
this view, asserting “we must presume that the Committee’s reorganization or
rephrasing accurately captured what the Framers meant in their unadorned
language. . . . We [conclude] that ‘the word “sole” is entitled to no less weight than
any other word of the text, because the Committee revision perfected what “had
been agreed to.” ’ ”105
7. Period of September 12-17: The Convention debates the Committee of
Style’s draft, makes slight modifications, and then approves the
Constitution.
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The Convention then proceeded to debate the Committee of Style=s draft for
several days. On September 12, 1787, George Mason and Elbridge Gerry
proposed the inclusion of a declaration of individual rights.106 The Convention
quickly voted 10 states to none to reject this proposal after Roger Sherman briefly
argued that the “State Declaration of Rights are not repealed” and that the
national “Legislature may be safely trusted.”107 On September 17, 1787, following
a number of minor modifications, the Convention approved the Constitution. All
of the individual deputies who were still at the Convention, except for Elbridge
Gerry, George Mason, and Edmund Randolph, signed the Constitution.108 The
Convention then adjourned.
Article VII says that the Constitution was approved “in Convention by the
Unanimous Consent of the States present.”109 This statement is true, but it does
not tell the whole story. Although the Constitution was approved by all states
“present,” it was not approved by Rhode Island or New York. Rhode Island did not
approve the Constitution, but it was not “present” because it sent no deputies.
New York also did not approve the Constitution but it also was not “present”;
although Alexander Hamilton remained after Robert Yates and John Lansing
departed, Hamilton could not represent the state by himself. This detail is
somewhat concealed because Hamilton signed the Constitution, identifying
himself as a deputy from New York. Hamilton could sign because the caption
above the signatures on the Constitution says that the signers had “subscribed”
their names merely in “witness” of the unanimous approval of the states presents;
the signatures therefore were not the approval itself.110
D. Records of the Constitutional Convention
Although the Constitutional Convention met in secret, with the members
agreeing not to discuss what took place,111 we now know a great deal about what
transpired during the proceedings. The Convention appointed Major William
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Jackson to serve as the secretary.112 In this capacity, he kept an official Journal
of the proceedings.113 The Journal includes minutes of the full Convention and
the proceedings as a Committee of a Whole. The minutes record the text of most
of the resolutions before the Convention and the votes taken on them.
Unfortunately, William Jackson made some mistakes in his record keeping. In
addition, Jackson also omitted various important details, such as the dates of
certain votes. Jackson also intentionally destroyed some of the records, either
because he did not think them worth saving or because he was seeking to
preserve secrecy. Professor Max Farrand, the great scholar of the Constitutional
Convention, accordingly has cautioned: “With notes so carelessly kept, as were
evidently those of the secretary, the Journal cannot be relied on absolutely.”114
In addition to the Journal, at least eight of the deputies kept notes. James
Madison attended every day of the Convention, and took substantial notes on each
day.115 For the most part, the notes taken by other deputies merely supplement
what is found in Madison’s notes. Madison wrote an introduction to his notes
explaining how he had prepared them. He said:
In pursuance of the task I had assumed I chose a seat in front of the
presiding member, with the other members on my right & left hands.
In this favorable position for hearing all that passed, I noted in terms
legible & in abbreviations & marks intelligible to myself what was
read from the Chair or spoken by the members; and losing not a
moment unnecessarily between the adjournment & reassembling of
the Convention I was enabled to write out my daily notes . . . during
the session or within a few finishing days after its close . . . in the
extent and form preserved in my own hand on my files.116
Professor Farrand has noted an aspect of Madison’s notes that deserves
special attention. Madison published the notes late in life, when his memory of the
Convention may have faded somewhat. To refresh his recollection, he relied on
William Jackson’s Journal to make revisions. In so doing, he may have
introduced errors.117
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Although Madison took the most complete notes, the historical record also
includes notes taken by seven other deputies. These deputies include:
#

Alexander Hamilton of New York, who kept brief notes on eight days of the
convention;118

#

Rufus King of Massachusetts, who took extensive notes on 18 days of the
convention;119

#

George Mason of Virginia, who took only a few pages of notes;120

#

James McHenry of Maryland, who took extensive notes before June 1, 1787
and after August 5th (but none in between because he was absent attending
to an ill relative);121

#

William Paterson of New Jersey, who made a variety of notes over the course
of the Convention;122

#

William Pierce of Georgia, who kept brief but interesting notes at the start of
the Convention;123 and

#

Robert Yates of New York, who took notes consistently from May 31, 1787
until July 5, 1787.124
D. Publication of the Records

The Convention, as explained above, decided that its deliberation should
remain secret. William Jackson’s journal and the notes taken by the various
deputies, accordingly, were kept confidential for many years following the
Constitutional Convention.
Jackson turned his journal over to George
Washington, who in turn gave it to the Department of State. The Department of
State held the Journal for many years. Not until 1819 was the Journal—as edited
by John Adams at the direction of Congress—first published.125 Yates published
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his notes in 1821.126 Madison’s notes were published posthumously in 1840. All
of the other notes became public at later dates.127
Between 1894 and 1905, the Bureau of Rolls and Library at the U.S. State
Department compiled The Documentary History of the Constitution of the United
States of America, 1786-1870, a five-volume work that among other things
collected almost all of the known notes and records of the Constitutional
Convention.128
In 1911, Professor Max Farrand of Yale University prepared a 3-volume
collection of all the known notes and similar documents from the Convention
called The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787.129 Farrand’s Records is a
highly influential and accurate collection of the notes and records of the
Constitutional Convention. Professor Farrand for the first time placed the
materials in chronological order, interspersing the journal entries and the notes
taken by the various deputies. This organization facilitated attempts to follow the
events of the convention as they unfolded. He tracked down numerous other
sources in addition to the notes, such as correspondence by the deputies shedding
light on the Convention’s actions. He also addressed and clarified a large number
of ambiguities in the notes.
Volume 1 of Farrand’s Records includes a very helpful introduction followed
by materials from the Convention, such as excerpts from Madison’s notes and the
Journal, that start on May 25, 1787, and run until July 13, 1787. Volume 2
includes materials from July 14, 1787, until the Convention ended on September
17, 1787. Volume 3 includes supplementary materials, such as copies of the
Virginia Plan, New Jersey Plan, the Hamilton Plan, and various drafts of the
Constitution. In 1937, the three original volumes were reprinted and a fourth
volume with even more supplementary materials was added.130 In 1987, James
H. Hutson, with the assistance of Leonard Rapport, prepared a Supplement to Max
Farrand’s the Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,131 which included various
126
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additional letters and other works, including George Washington’s diary during
the Convention. Because of its comprehensive collection, chronological
organization, and attention to detail, Farrand’s Records and its supplements are
the preferred sources of the courts and most scholars. As explained in the
Appendix, the Library of Congress’s website includes a copy of the 1911 edition of
Farrand’s work, in both an image format and a searchable text format;
accordingly, it is now much easier to located relevant information in the records
than in the past.132
One final very practical matter merits brief mention: Because almost all
courts and law review articles rely on Max Farrand’s Records, questions often
arise about how to cite them. I recommend that writers use the general Bluebook
citation form for multivolume books with an editor133 followed by two optional but
very helpful parenthetical phrases. The first parenthetical phrase should identify
the source of the record (e.g., “Madison’s Notes,” “Journal,” etc.) and the date of
the record. The second parenthetical should identify the speaker if a speaker is
being quoted. In addition, because the title of the multivolume work is so long
that it would be cumbersome to repeat it in subsequent citations, I also
recommend establishing a shortened form for referring to it.134 The typical short
form, used in the Harvard Law Review and elsewhere, is “FARRAND’S RECORDS.”
Consider for example an article citing the following remark of George Mason as
recorded by James Madison on July 18, 1787: “The mode of appointing Judges
may depend in some degree on the mode of trying impeachments, of the
Executive.” A citation for this quotation might take the following form:
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 41-42 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS] (Madison’s
Notes, Jul. 18, 1787) (statement of George Mason).
Subsequent citations then would cite the work using the short form of “2
FARRAND'S RECORDS.”
III. Theory and Practice of Citing the Records of the Constitutional
Convention as Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Constitution
A. History of Citing the Records
See Library of Congress, Farrand’s Records, <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/
lwfr.html> (visited Feb. 5, 2012).
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Judicial opinions did not rely on the records of the Constitutional
Convention during early years for the simple reason that judges and lawyers did
not have access to the records. As noted above, the most significant of these
records, Madison’s notes, were first published in 1840. But once the records of
the Convention became public, judges began to cite them for evidence of the
meaning of the Constitution. In 1854, the Supreme Court cited Madison’s notes
in Pennsylvania v. Howard.135 In that case, the Court rejected a challenge under
the Ex Post Facto Clause136 to the retroactive application of a state inheritance
statute. In its opinion, the Court cited Madison’s notes for evidence that the
Framers did not intend the clause to apply to civil laws. The Court said: “The
debates in the federal convention upon the constitution show that the terms ‘ex
post facto laws’ were understood in a restricted sense, relating to criminal cases
only, and that the description of Blackstone of such laws was referred to for their
meaning. 3 Mad. Pap. 1399, 1450, 1579.”137
The Supreme Court has continued to cite the records of the Convention in
the modern era. In the past four decades, the Supreme Court has referred to
them in at least 71 cases.138 Many of the Court’s landmark constitutional
decisions rely heavily on them. In Buckley v. Valeo,139 for example, the Supreme
Court held among many other things that only the President may appoint officers
of the United States.140 In its reasoning, the Court considered but rejected an
argument that this holding would contradict the intent of the Framers by making
Congress inferior to the executive and judicial branches.141 The Court said: “[T]he
debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . are replete with expressions of fear
that the Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the
expense of the other two branches.”142 The Court supported this assertion with
numerous references to Madison’s notes.143 Similarly, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton,144 both the majority and dissent relied on the records of the
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Constitutional Convention in reviewing a state law that limited the ability of
Congressional incumbents to have their names appear on ballots.145
Lower courts also regularly cite the records of the Constitutional
Convention. More than 230 cases in the past four decades have relied on them.146
As one might expect, jurists generally known for taking an originalist perspective
on constitutional issues—like Judge Frank Easterbrook and retired Judge Robert
H. Bork—have cited the records in their opinions.147 Perhaps more interestingly,
jurists not generally considered originalists—like Judge Stephen Reinhardt or
retired Judge Patricia Wald—also have relied on the records.148 Academic authors
also pay a great deal of attention to the records of the Constitutional Convention,
and have cited them in thousands of law review articles that address nearly every
constitutional issue imaginable.149
B. How the Records of the Constitutional Convention Have Been Cited as
Evidence of the Original Intent of the Framers
As odd as this proposition at first may sound, the Constitution in some
instances may have had more than one “original meaning.” Specifically, the
Framers (i.e., the deputies at the Federal Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia) may have intended the Constitution to have one meaning, the
participants at the state ratifying conventions may have understood it to have a
slightly different meaning, and the words and phrases in the Constitution may
have had a still different objective meaning based on the customary usage of
language at the time. Other works have identified several specific examples of this
phenomenon.150 Substantial debates have existed for a long time over whether
one of these types original meanings or any of them should control interpretation
of the constitution.151 Some writers have argued that the original intent of the
See id. at 790 (citing “2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 249-250 (M.
Farrand ed. 1911”).
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Framers is the most important,152 others believe it is the original understanding of
the ratifiers,153 still others have said that it is the original objective meaning,154
and of course some may contend that the original meaning should not control
modern interpretation of the Constitution.155
This essay does not seek to enter the controversy over which original
meaning, if any, is most significant. Instead, it will suffice to point out that most
writers who cite the records of the Constitutional Convention claim that the
records provide evidence of the original intent of the Framers, as opposed to the
original understanding of the ratifiers or the original objective meaning of the
Constitution. Their theory for citing the records to show the Famers’ intent is not
often articulated, but it presumably rests on the reasoning that the most direct
way to determine what the Framers intended—given that we cannot ask them
now—is to look at the comments, suggestions, arguments, and other remarks that
they made while drafting and approving the Constitution. (The following section of
this part considers possible, although limited, ways in which the records
alternatively might provide evidence of the original understanding of the ratifiers
or the original objective meaning.)
Making claims about the original intent of the Framers based on the records
of the Constitutional Convention unfortunately is usually not a simple exercise. It
would be very convenient for us now if at the Convention James Madison,
See Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in
ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47, 53 (Steven Calabresi ed., 2007); Lino A.
Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (19911992).
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Gouveneur Morris, James Wilson, or some other deputy had made succinct
speeches defining each of the terms in the Constitution, giving examples of how
they should apply in a variety of situations, and then asking for and receiving
some indication that the majority of the other deputies concurred. But that did
not happen often. The deputies very rarely explicitly defined terms or addressed
ambiguities. And they did not take votes about the correctness of everything that
was said.
As a result, writers using the records to make claims about what the
Framers intended usually must rely on indirect clues and logical reasoning for
support. It would be impossible to attempt to list and describe all of the different
kinds of evidence and kinds of reasoning writers have used or could use. But
what follows are four of the most common types of reasoning used by judges and
academics when making assertions about how the records of the Convention show
the Framers’ Intent:
1. Reliance on Arguments Made in Support of Provisions that Ultimately Were
Included in the Constitution.
Sometimes courts and other writers make claims about the Framers’ intent
with respect to particular constitutional provisions by citing arguments that
deputies had made in support of those provisions. For example, in United States
v. International Business Machines Corp.,156 the Supreme Court had to decide
whether the Export Clause prohibited imposing a federal tax on insurance policies
covering exported goods. The Export Clause says: “No Tax or Duty shall be laid
on Articles exported from any State.”157 The government argued for a narrow
interpretation of the Export Clause that would allow the Court to uphold the
tax.158 But the Court concluded that the Framers had intended to deny Congress
the power to tax exports at all, and therefore that Congress could not tax the
insurance policies.159 In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited statements
made by deputies who spoke in favor of adopting the clause. The Court said:
While the original impetus may have had a narrow focus, the
remedial provision that ultimately became the Export Clause does
not, and there is substantial evidence from the Debates that
proponents of the Clause fully intended the breadth of scope that is
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evident in the language. See, e. g., 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal
Convention . . . at 220 (Mr. King: “In two great points the hands of
the Legislature were absolutely tied. The importation of slaves could
not be prohibited-exports could not be taxed”); id., at 305 (“Mr.
Mason urged the necessity of connecting with the power of levying
taxes . . . that no tax should be laid on exports”); id., at 360 (Mr.
Elseworth [sic]: “There are solid reasons agst. Congs taxing exports”);
ibid. (“Mr. Butler was strenuously opposed to a power over exports”);
id., at 361 (Mr. Sherman: “It is best to prohibit the National
legislature in all cases”); id., at 362 (“Mr. Gerry was strenuously
opposed to the power over exports”).160
Notice in this passage that none of the speakers quoted directly said
anything like “the clause we are adopting imposes a complete ban on federal taxes
on exports.” What each of the quoted speakers said instead indicated that they
supported a complete ban such taxes. The Court’s unspoken logical inference is
that the arguments of these speakers prevailed and, in the Export Clause that was
ultimately adopted, they achieved what they wanted: a complete ban on taxes on
exports.
The theory for citing arguments made by persons who supported a
constitutional provision as evidence of the provision’s intended meaning is familiar
to anyone who studies legislative debates. When a provision is debated and then
approved, it is usually the people who supported the provisions whose views
prevailed and whose views therefore reflect the majority’s sentiments. This theory
may not be true in all cases because supporters of a provision may have different
understandings of the provision or because compromises may have been
necessary to obtain passage. But the theory is not an uncommon or baseless
generalization.
2. Reliance on the Rejection of Arguments Made Against Provisions that were
Ultimately Included in the Constitution.
Sometimes writers rely on the rejection of arguments made by opponents of
constitutional provisions to determine the meaning of those provisions. For
example, when a prohibition on ex post facto laws was proposed, Oliver Ellsworth
and James Wilson argued against including the prohibition on grounds that the ex
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post facto law violated principles of natural law and that it was therefore
unnecessary to include them.161 Madison documented the arguments as follows:
Mr. ELSEWORTH contended that there was no lawyer, no civilian
who would not say that ex post facto laws are void of themselves. It
can not then be necessary to prohibit them.
Mr. WILSON was against inserting any thing in the Constitution as to
ex post facto laws. It will bring reflexions on the Constitution—and
proclaim that we are ignorant of the first principles of Legislation, or
are constituting a Government which will be so . . . .162
Dr. William Johnson went further, and argued that including an express
prohibition on ex post facto laws would be dangerous because it might suggest
that Congress would pass improper laws if not restrained:
Doc'r JOHNSON thought the clause unnecessary, and implying an
improper suspicion of the National Legislature.163
The Convention, however, apparently rejected all of these arguments against
including express prohibitions against ex post facto clauses because the Ex Post
Facto clauses were included in the Constitution.164 Professor Susannah Sherry
concludes from the debate: “This exchange strongly suggests that the deputies,
who by this time understood that they were enacting fundamental law, did not
intend to enact positively all existing fundamental law, instead relying on
unwritten natural rights to supplement the enacted Constitution.”165 In other
words, the rejection of the arguments of the opponents of the clauses, according to
Professor Sherry, indicated that the deputies as a whole did not think that by
expressing some protections in the Constitution, they were necessarily excluding
unstated protections.
Notice here again the evidence for the conclusion about the Framer’s intent
is indirect. No one said expressly: “When we include some rights expressly in the
Constitution, we do not mean to suggest that other rights are not protected.” But
Professor Sherry infers this to be the case because the Convention rejected the
161
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arguments of those who said that such a suggestion would be implicit. The theory
here is that the Framers’ intent differs from the views of those who opposed
provisions that were adopted. The theory must rest on the idea that, if the
opponents’ arguments had been accepted, then the provisions would not be
adopted. Again, while this may sometimes be an overgeneralization, it is a
common type of argument when attempting to discern the intent of a deliberative
body.
3. Reliance on Negative Inferences Drawn from Proposals that were Rejected
by the Convention
In some instances, writers rely on proposals rejected by the Constitutional
Convention to show the Framers’ intent. For example, in Kawakita v. United
States, a person holding Japanese and American citizenship challenged his
conviction for treason for actions taken in Japan during World War II.166 He
argued that treason against the United States cannot be committed abroad by an
American with a dual nationality. Relying heavily on the records of the
Constitutional Convention, the Supreme Court rejected the argument, saying:
The definition of treason . . . contained in the Constitution contains
no territorial limitation. “Treason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. * * *’ ” Art. III, § 3. A
substitute proposal containing some territorial limitations was
rejected by the Constitutional Convention. See 2 Farrand, The
Records of the Federal Convention, pp. 347-348. . . . We must
therefore reject the suggestion that an American citizen living beyond
the territorial limits of the United States may not commit treason
against them. 167
The cited excerpt from records says the following:
Mr. Govr Morris and Mr Randolph wished to substitute the
words of the British Statute <and moved to postpone Sect. 2. art VII
in order to consider the following substitute—“Whereas it is essential
to the preservation of liberty to define precisely and exclusively what
shall constitute the crime of Treason, it is therefore ordained,
declared & established, that if a man do levy war agst. the U. S.
within their territories, or be adherent to the enemies of the U. S.
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within the said territories, giving them aid and comfort within their
territories or elsewhere, and thereof be provably attainted of open
deed by the People of his condition, he shall be adjudged guilty of
Treason”>
On this question: N.H Mas- no. Ct. no. N. J- ay Pa. no. Del. no. Md.
no. Va.- ay. N. C. no- S. C. no. Geo- no. [Ayes -- 2; noes -- 8.]168
Notice that the deputies did not expressly resolve that treason was a crime
that might be committed anywhere in the world. Instead, they rejected a proposal
that would have expressly established that the crime of treason can be committed
only within the territory of the United States. The Court infers from the rejection
of this proposal that the Convention did not want to impose any territorial
limitations. Again, the logic is not iron-tight; it could be that the Convention
rejected the proposal for reasons other than the proposed territorial limitation.
Still, the inference drawn by the Supreme Court is one commonly drawn when
looking at evidence of this type.
4. Reliance on Comparisons of Different Draft Versions of Provisions
Ultimately Included in the Constitution.
Various parts of the Constitution went through multiple drafts before
reaching their final forms. Sometimes judges and other writers draw inferences
from changes made in these various drafts. For example, in Utah v. Evans,169 the
Supreme Court had to determine the meaning of the term “actual enumeration” in
the Census Clause.170 The State of Utah challenged the method by which the
Census Bureau was gathering its data. Utah argued that the words “actual
Enumeration” required the Census Bureau to seek out each individual that the
Census Bureau counted and therefore contended that the Census Bureau
therefore could not rely upon “imputation” or the completion of data by making
assumptions.171 The Court rejected this view, focusing on how the words “actual
enumeration” came to appear in the final draft. The Court said:
The history of the constitutional phrase supports our understanding
of the text. The Convention sent to its Committee of Detail a draft
stating that Congress was to “regulate the number of representatives
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 347-348 (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 20, 1787)
(emphasis added and footnote omitted).
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by the number of inhabitants, . . . which number shall . . . be taken
in such manner as . . . [Congress] shall direct.” 2 M. Farrand,
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 178, 182-183 . . . .
After making minor, here irrelevant, changes, the Committee of Detail
sent the draft to the Committee of Style, which, in revising the
language, added the words “actual Enumeration.” Id., at 590, 591.
Although not dispositive, this strongly suggests a similar meaning, for
the Committee of Style “had no authority from the Convention to alter
the meaning” of the draft Constitution submitted for its review and
revision. . . . Hence, the Framers would have intended the current
phrase, “the actual Enumeration shall be made . . . in such Manner
as [Congress] . . . shall by Law direct,” as the substantive equivalent
of the draft phrase, “which number [of inhabitants] shall . . . be taken
in such manner as [Congress] shall direct.” 2 Farrand 183.172
In other words, the language initially approved by the Convention did not
use the words “actual enumeration.” These words were added by the Committee
of Style, a committee that was directed not to change any meanings. The
inference therefore is that even though the clause uses the words “actual
enumeration,” the Framers intended the clause to mean the same thing that it
would have meant if it did not contain these specific words. While that was the
conclusion of the Supreme Court in this case, other changes in the language of
drafts, however, might indicate that the framers intended to change the meaning
of other provisions of the Constitution.
The foregoing examples show just four ways that courts and scholars have
relied on the records of the Constitutional Convention in making claims about the
Framers’ intent. These four ways are not the only ways that the records may be
used, but they are among the most common. Certainly other writers, using logic
and ingenuity, may find additional ways to make inferences about what the
Framers intended based on the Records.
C. How the Records of the Constitutional Convention have been used as
Evidence of the Original Understanding of the Ratifiers or as Evidence of
the Original Objective Meaning of the Constitution
Although the records of the Constitutional Convention are mostly relied on
to support claims about the original intent of the Framers, the records also might
provide limited evidence of the original understanding of the ratifiers and of the
original objective meaning of the Constitution.
172
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The best evidence of the original understanding of the ratifiers comes from
the records of the state ratifying conventions.173 But those records are not the
only evidence. An argument that the records of the Convention might be relevant
is the following: Deputies to the federal Convention also served as delegates to the
state ratifying conventions in every state except Rhode Island.174 Their views,
accordingly, represent not only the views of the Framers, but also the views of at
least some of the ratifiers.175 Indeed, they may reflect the ideas of some of the
most important ratifiers because many of these deputies played very important
roles at the state conventions. It is thus probably not a stretch to imagine that
their understanding of the Constitution helped to shape the understanding of
others at the ratifying conventions. Thus, even though the Records of the
Constitutional Convention were not published until later, they may provide some
indirect evidence about what the ratifiers were thinking.
One example comes from U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.176 In that case,
the Court discussed at considerable length what the ratifiers of the Constitution
thought about the need for “rotation” of public officials by limiting the maximum
years or terms that they could remain in office. The Court said:
The draft of the Constitution that was submitted for ratification
contained no provision for rotation. In arguments . . . opponents of
ratification condemned the absence of a rotation requirement, noting
that “there is no doubt that senators will hold their office perpetually;
and in this situation, they must of necessity lose their dependence,
and their attachments to the people.” Even proponents of ratification
expressed concern about the “abandonment in every instance of the
necessity of rotation in office.” At several ratification conventions,
participants proposed amendments that would have required
rotation.177
While this passage was addressing the understanding of the ratifiers, the Court
bolstered its assertions with a footnote citing the records of the Constitutional
Convention. The footnote said in part: “A proposal requiring rotation for Members
of the House was proposed at the Convention, see 1 Farrand 20, but was defeated
See Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the State Ratifying Conventions as a Source
of the Original Meaning of the Constitution, supra note 3, at 482.

173

174

See infra appendix B.

175

See id.

176

514 U.S. 779 (1995).

177

Id. at 812-813 (footnotes omitted).

30

unanimously, see id., at 217.”178 The thought in including this footnote appears to
have been that it lends credibility to claims about the original understanding of
the ratifiers to point out that their asserted understanding matches the intent of
the Framers, especially when so many of the Framers participated in ratification
debates.
The records of the Constitutional Convention also may provide some
evidence of the original objective meaning of the Constitution. This meaning, as
discussed above, is the meaning that the public would have attached to the words
and phrases in the Constitution based on their ordinary meanings and context.
Courts often rely on period dictionaries to determine the objective meaning of
words. But they can also make inferences about the meaning by examining texts
of all sorts from the period. Because the Records of the Constitutional Convention
are from the relevant era, they thus can provide some evidence of the original
objective meaning.
For example, in seeking to determine the original objective meaning of the
term “commerce” in the Commerce Clause,179 Professor Randy Barnett looked at a
wide variety of period sources to see how the word was used.180 These sources
included the other text in the Constitution, contemporary dictionaries, the
Federalist Papers, notes from the state ratification debates, early judicial
interpretations, and in addition all of these, record of the constitutional
convention. Professor Barnett says in part:
In Madison's notes for the Constitutional Convention, the term
“commerce” appears thirty-four times in the speeches of the
delegates. Eight of these are unambiguous references to commerce
with foreign nations which can only consist of trade. In every other
instance, the terms “trade” or “exchange” could be substituted for the
term “commerce” with the apparent meaning of the statement
preserved. In no instance is the term “commerce” clearly used to
refer to “any gainful activity” or anything broader than trade.
Professor Barnett is not making any claims about what the Framers subjectively
intended the Commerce Clause to mean. Instead, he is just looking at how the
178
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people of the period, including the Framers, used the word “commerce” in order to
determine its objective meaning. The theory is apparently that the records of the
constitutional convention provide a substantial body of linguistic evidence of how
words and phrases—especially the words in phrases in the Constitution—were
used. This body of linguistic evidence may be considered along with other
evidence to determine the objective meaning of the words in the Constitution at
the time of its adoption.
IV. Potential Grounds for Impeaching Claims about the Original Meaning of
the Constitution that Rely on the Records of the Constitutional Convention
Many lawyers, judges, and scholars correctly approach the records of the
Constitutional Convention with a degree of awe. The records preserve the
thoughts of the great figures of the founding era as they were drafting and
debating the nation’s most fundamental legal document. Perusing the records,
accordingly, is almost like joining the framers at the Constitutional Convention,
facing with them the great issues, and watching as the framers work through
them.
The august provenance of the records, however, should not blur careful
thought about their use as evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution.
Some writers fall into the mistake of thinking that, because a particular passage
appears in the notes and records of the Convention, the passage offers definitive
proof about what the Constitution means. In reality, statements taken from the
notes and records of the Constitutional Convention do not always provide
unassailable evidence of the original meaning. In fact, when someone makes an
argument about the original intent of the Framers that relies on the records of the
convention to support a controversial claim, it is not uncommon for someone else
to disagree about whether the evidence supports the claim.
The following paragraphs identify six important potential grounds for
impeaching claims made about the original meaning of the Constitution based on
passages taken from the records of the Constitutional Convention. Not all claims
about the original meaning suffer from the weaknesses identified by this list of
grounds for impeachment. In addition, each of the identified grounds is also
subject to significant limitations or counter arguments. Yet, a good practice would
be for any writers making assertions based on the records, or any readers
assessing the assertions of others, to consider in each case whether any of these
potential criticisms is applicable.
1. The claim relies on specific words included in the records without
recognizing that the records are not a verbatim account of what was said at
the Convention.
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Writers sometimes rely on the specific words used in the records of the
Constitutional Convention when making claims about the original meaning of the
Constitution. For example, in Nixon v. Sirica, a case involving President Richard
Nixon, Judge MacKinnon placed special emphasis on Gouverneur Morris’s use of
the word “after” in a statement about the relationship between a criminal trial and
an impeachment.181 Judge MacKinnon wrote:
The contemporaneous view of the Framers clearly supports the view
that all aspects of criminal prosecution of a President must follow
impeachment. For example, Gouverneur Morris stated during the
debates on impeachment that:
A conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the
Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was that
the latter was to try the President after the trial of the
impeachment.
2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 500 (rev. ed. 1966)
(emphasis added).182
A potential ground for questioning claims of this sort is that the deputies
who took notes at the Convention could not and did not make verbatim
transcripts of what was said at the Convention. In most instances, for this
reason, no one can know for certain whether the notes record the specific words
that the deputies used when debating the Constitution. James Madison, who kept
the most thorough records, prefaces his account with this important warning:
It may be proper to remark, that, with a very few exceptions, the
speeches were neither furnished, nor revised, nor sanctioned, by the
speakers, but written out from my notes, aided by the freshness of
my recollections.183
For this reason, Madison’s notes seldom provide an exact account of the various
deputies’ views on particular issues.
In the quotation of Gouverneur Morris above, Madison may not have
captured Morris’s exact words. For example, Morris might have said something
487 F.2d 700, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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lengthy like: “A conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the Supreme
Court the Judge of impeachments is that two separate trials are possible. The
Senate can try the impeachment and remove the President from office, and the
courts can try the President separately on any criminal charges and put him in
prison.” Madison may have abbreviated this longer statement by simply saying
the courts would try the President “after” the trial of impeachment. The
abbreviation would not be wholly accurate, but abbreviations by definition are not
never a complete account of something.
We know that Madison’s notes plainly omit much of what the Deputies said
during debates. James H. Hutson has calculated that in the month of June, when
Madison took the greatest volume of his notes, he wrote down on average only
2,740 words per session.184 A person speaking at the normal speaking rate of 180
words per minute could say all of these words in about 15 minutes.185 The
deputies surely must have said much more during their day long meetings, but we
will never know exactly what they said.
Even when the various note takers sought to memorialize what their fellow
deputies were saying, they clearly did not copy every word verbatim. We know
this because the notes often disagree about what exactly was said. A good
example concerns the Constitution’s provision saying that “Congress shall have
Power . . . To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”186 In attempting
to discern the original intention of the Framers, Professor David Engdahl has
observed that the Convention records offer conflicting accounts of its drafting. He
explains:
Madison . . . reports that the motion used the word “institute,” not
“constitute.” “Institute” also was the word Dickinson used in the
earlier comment that prompted the Wilson-Madison motion.
Accounts of the same motion in the Journal and in Yates’s notes use
the word “appoint” instead. Moreover, Madison reports that
discussion of the motion took place in terms of “establishing” such
courts. Both the Journal and Madison show the word “appoint”
being used when the proposition was reaffirmed on July 18th; and

James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary
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“appoint” was the word employed in the resolution as referred to the
Committee of Detail.187
This kind of disagreement, needless to say, makes it difficult to rely on any of the
words quoted on the subject.
Another factor may contribute to a discrepancy between what was actually
said and what Madison’s notes record: Madison appears to have expanded many
of his own remarks at the Convention. In several instances, Madison’s accounts
of his speeches may take multiple pages, while other note takers may summarize
them in just a few lines. James H. Hutson hypothesizes that Madison spoke
extemporaneously, and then wrote down and augmented his remarks after each
session was completed.188 Given that Madison took the most notes and did the
second most talking, this shortcoming of the notes has substantial significance.
For these reasons, anyone reading the notes should avoid placing excessive
weight on any particular choice of words. The quotations may not be entirely
accurate. This caveat, however, does not mean that the notes are completely
unreliable. Scholars and judges stand on firmer ground when they cite the notes
as evidence of what the deputies were generally thinking. They are on weakest
ground when they assume that direct quotation of the words used in the notes
proves exactly what the deputies said.
To return to the example above, given the general nature of his remarks, it
appears that Gouverneur Morris was arguing that both the Senate and the courts
should be involved when the President is accused of committing a crime because
two separate trials are necessary. The issue of whether the criminal trial should
come before or after the Senate’s trial of the impeachment is not central to his
argument. (It is certainly possible for a criminal trial to occur before an
impeachment; although a President has not faced criminal charges, federal judges
have been tried and convicted of criminal offenses in court before ever being tried
by the Senate and removed from office.189) For this reason, although excessive
reliance on the word “after” in Morris’s quotation may be questionable, reliance on
the general idea that there should be two trials, one in the Senate and one in the
courts, is much less so.
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2. The claim relies on particular statements in the records of the Convention
without recognizing that the records also contain contradictory statements.
The Convention records are numerous, they are not verbatim, and they
include the works of several different participants. For these reasons, perhaps
unsurprisingly, the records contain numerous contradictory statements. For
example, consider the provision in Article III giving federal courts jurisdiction over
cases “arising under laws of the United States.”190 One question, discussed by
Steward Jay, is whether the Framers intended the term “laws of the United States”
to include only federal legislation or whether the term includes both federal
legislation and federal common law.191 A proponent of the idea that the Framers
were thinking only about statutes might cite the Journal for evidence of the
original intent. The Journal records that, on July 18, 1787, the Convention
resolved that “the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases
arising under laws passed by the general Legislature . . . .”192 Although the
Committee on Detail later made stylistic changes, the July 18 resolution certainly
suggests that the deputies were thinking only of legislation and not of common
law. Madison’s notes, however, provide a different account of the Convention’s
resolution. According to Madison, the Convention resolved that federal courts
would have jurisdiction in cases arising “under the Natl. laws.”193 Under this
resolution, the term “National laws” might include both federal common law and
legislation.194
This example does not prove that every statement in the records is
unreliable because it is contradicted by some other statement. Nor does it show
that writers can place no reliance on contradicted statements. But the example
does show that anyone who cites statements taken from notes of the
Constitutional Convention needs to look carefully for contradictory evidence.
Farrand’s Records includes both a general index,195 and an index by clauses of the
Constitution.196 These superb indices can be extremely helpful in finding
everything said about a particular topic and thus help to locate potential conflicts.
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If conflicts are found, then writers must find reasons for choosing one view over
the other. A statement in a resolution adopted by the Convention, for example,
may carry more weight than an oral aside made by one of the parties when
debating an unrelated issue.
3. The claim relies on particular statements in the records of the convention
without recognizing that evidence from other sources contradicts the
statements.
Sometimes statements in the records of the federal Convention contradict
evidence from other sources. For example, they may conflict with arguments
made at the state ratifying conventions, remarks in the Federalist Papers, and
debates about early federal legislation. These contradictions weaken the authority
of all of the sources.
Professor Jonathan Turley has identified one example.197 At the Convention,
Madison argued that “mal-administration” was not an appropriate ground for the
impeachment of the President because it was too ambiguous.198 Yet, several years
later while serving as a member of Congress, Madison said that maladministration would be a basis for impeachment.199 Madison either changed his
mind, or the records contain an error; either way, historians have difficulty using
these sources to determine the original meaning of the Constitution.
The existence of contrary statements should come as little surprise. The
confidentiality of the Convention proceedings may have freed the deputies from
the burden of adhering to their views; they could change their minds without
others knowing about it. Accordingly, looking at the notes alone seldom produces
a complete account of what the deputies at the Federal Convention were thinking.
An extremely useful source for identifying potential conflict among sources is The
Founders' Constitution, a 5-volume work edited by Philip B. Kurland and Ralph
Lerner, which is available both in print and online.200 The editors of this work
See Jonathan Turley, Congress as Grand Jury: The Role of the House of Representatives
in the Impeachment of an American President, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 735, 750 & nn. 88 &
91 (1999).
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have located, collected, and reprinted historical sources—including records of the
Constitutional Convention—that address nearly every clause in the Constitution.
4. The claim relies on particular statements in the records of the convention
but it is unclear that the majority of the deputies agreed with the position
stated.
Many authors cite statements in the records without indicating who made
the statements or whether the Convention agreed with them. For example, in
Saenz v. Roe, the Supreme Court cited a single sentence from the Records as
evidence that the Framers based Article IV of the Constitution on Article IV of the
Articles of Confederation.201 The Court, however, did not indicate who uttered the
sentence or whether anyone agreed with it.
This practice is generally unpersuasive because some excerpts from the
Record do not reflect the intent of the Framers. A total of fifty-five deputies
attended the Convention. They expressed a wide variety of different ideas during
their debates. Sometimes the majority of deputies (or at least a majority of the
state delegations) agreed with the arguments, and sometimes they did not. In
some instances, speakers addressed topics that the Convention never thought
necessary to decide by vote. For this reason, even if a passage presents evidence
of what one of the deputies believed, it does not necessarily prove that all of the
deputies shared that belief. Before citing passages from the records, authors
should consider their content and context.202 They stand on firmest ground when
they can point to the kinds of reasoning described in part III.B. for inferring that
statements or action reveal the Framers’ intent with respect to particular matter.
5. The claim relies on excerpts from the records of the Constitutional
Convention that lack sufficient detail to support the proposition for which
they are cited.
Anyone reading the notes and records of the Constitutional Convention for
evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution soon discovers the deputies
often are not recorded as having said much about the issues they confronted. The
notes cover many topics with just a phrase, a sentence, or possibly a paragraph,
and on some issues there is almost no explication. For example, the Supreme
526 U.S. 489, 501 n.13 (1999) (citing “3 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p.
112 (M. Farrand ed. 1966)”). The statement was by Charles Pinckney.
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Court has observed that the clause providing for the appointment of inferior
officers203 “was added to the proposed Constitution on the last day of the Grand
Convention, with little discussion.”204 In such cases, statements taken from the
notes and records often lack sufficient detail to provide persuasive evidence of the
original meaning on particular questions.
For this reason, critics sometimes dismiss claims about the original
meaning if they are based on what they consider ambiguous snippets taken from
the records. For instance, in reviewing Raoul Berger’s book, Federalism: The
Founders’ Design, Professor Mark V. Tushnet wrote that he found the account of
the original intent regarding federalism “massively unconvincing,” asserting that
Berger had justified his claims by taking “snippets of statements about federalism
from the debates on the Constitution, as if a compilation of snippets amounted to
an interpretation of intent.”205 Similarly, Professor Calvin R. Massey, questioned
whether the Supreme Court by “[s]titching together snippets of . . . expressions of
concern in the 1787 Convention”206 had properly discerned the original intent of
the Framers on the subject of state imposed term limits on members of Congress
in U.S. Term Limits v. Thorton.207
Although this potential ground for impeachment may have merit in some
instances, it is not universally true that the records are too ambiguous to provide
any guidance on the original meaning of the Constitution with respect to all
issues. For example, the Records make abundantly clear that, when the
Constitution uses the phrase “three fifths of all other Persons” in explaining the
apportionment of representatives and direct taxes,208 the term “other Persons” is a
euphemism for slaves.209
Writers can best avoid the potential criticism simply by not exaggerating
what the records show. If the records do not provide clear answers, they should
acknowledge this limitation. For example, in Powell v. McCormack, the Supreme
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Court confronted the question of whether the House of Representatives could
exclude Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. from its membership based on his prior
misconduct.210 An important issue in the case was whether the age, citizenship,
and residency requirements set forth in Article I are the exclusive qualifications for
representatives.211 The Supreme Court considered numerous passages from the
records of the Constitutional Convention. Although these records contained some
relevant statements, the Court ultimately announced that the debates themselves
simply were inconclusive on the specific issue before it.212
6. The claim relies on statements taken from the records without recognizing
the potential personal biases of the individuals who created the records.
The seven deputies who took notes did not attend the Convention as
disinterested observers. On the contrary, they actively participated in the debates.
Each of them had their own views of the issues. The two deputies who took the
most copious notes, Madison and Yates, fundamentally disagreed about the
project of the Convention. The personal views of the deputies may have colored
their notes or even led them to misreport the views of the other deputies.
Professor William W. Crosskey famously accused Madison of this type of bias.
Crosskey asserted that, for political reasons, Madison “presented falsely the
sentiments of other men” and invented statements that he put in his notes.213
Professor Richard B. Bernstein and Kym S. Rice similarly have speculated that
Robert Yates may have been taking notes to provide “ammunition to justify his
and Lansing’s opposition to the Convention.”214
No surefire method exists for assessing the degree of intentional or
unintentional bias in the notes taken by deputies. Indeed, even if Madison or the
other note takers accurately recorded some of the debates, they could have
distorted other parts. For this reason, claims about the original intent of the
Framers ideally should rest on notes taken by more than one person. If the notes
of several deputies express similar sentiments, the likelihood that any one them
misrepresented the proceedings diminishes.
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V. Conclusion
This essay has attempted to provide guidance to judge, lawyers, law
students, and others who are seeking to make or evaluate arguments about the
original meaning of the Constitution based on the records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787. Beyond describing the Convention, its records, and how
writers cite the records, its most important message is that task of using the
records to show the original meaning of the Constitution is difficult. The records
unfortunately do not provide direct answers to most questions. Instead, it is
necessary in most cases to draw inferences from arguments made by supporters
or opponents of particular provisions or from variations in drafts. Even then, there
are important pitfalls to avoid in making claims about the original meaning.
Appendix A. Annotated Bibliography
1. Max Farrand’s classic Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed.
1937) (4 volumes) contains all the notes and records of the Constitutional
Convention known until 1937. The introduction contains an extremely detailed
account of who took notes, when they were published, and why they may have
inaccuracies. The indices are invaluable as finding aids. The first three volumes
are available on line at the Library of Congress’s website: http://memory.
loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwfr.html
2. James Hutson’s Supplement to Max Farrand’s The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787 (1987), updates the earlier four volumes by including sources
discovered between 1937 and 1987.
3. John R. Vile’s The Constitutional Convention of 1787: A Comprehensive
Encyclopedia of America’s Founding (2005) (2 volumes). This comprehensive and
extremely accessible work contains several hundred entries, arranged from A-Z,
on all manner of topics relating to the Convention.
4. The Founders’ Constitution (1987) is a 5-volume work edited by Philip B.
Kurland and Ralph Lerner. It breaks the Constitution down into individual
clauses, and contains then contains historical sources from the founding period—
including records from the Constitutional Convention—that address those
sources. The works is available at the University of Chicago Press’s website:
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders.
5. The Framing of the Federal Constitution (1979) by Robert Morris provides
a short, readable, but thorough account of the Constitutional Convention.
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6. Are We to be a Nation (1987), by Richard B. Bernstein and with Kym S.
Rice, contains an informative account not only of what the Framers did at
Philadelphia but also the context in which they acted.
7. James H. Hutson’s article, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity
of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1986), presents highly interesting
information about the notes and records of the Constitutional Convention,
including many potential problems in relying on them for evidence of the original
meaning of the Constitution.
8. Robert N. Clinton provides an introductory description, designed for law
students, in A Brief History of the Adoption of the United States Constitution, 75
IOWA L. REV. 891 (1990).
Appendix B. Table of Deputies at the Constitutional Convention
* = did not sign the Constitution
† = subsequently participated at the state ratifying convention215
Connecticut
William Samuel Johnson†
Roger Sherman†
Oliver Ellsworth (Elsworth)*†

James McHenry†
Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer
Daniel Carroll
Luther Martin*†
John F. Mercer*†

Delaware
George Read
Gunning Bedford, Jr.†
John Dickinson
Richard Bassett†
Jacob Broom

Massachusetts
Nathaniel Gorham†
Rufus King†
Elbridge Gerry*† (spoke at the state
ratifying convention but was not a
delegate)
Caleb Strong*†

Georgia
William Few†
Abraham Baldwin
William Houston*
William L. Pierce*

New Hampshire
John Langdon†
Nicholas Gilman

Maryland

New Jersey

See Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the State Ratifying Conventions as a Source
of the Original Meaning of the Constitution, supra note 3, at 468-481.
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William Livingston
David Brearly (Brearley)†
William Paterson (Patterson)
Jonathan Dayton
William C. Houston*

Thomas Fitzsimons (FitzSimons;
Fitzsimmons)
Jared Ingersoll
James Wilson†
Gouverneur Morris

New York
Alexander Hamilton†
John Lansing, Jr.*†
Robert Yates*†

Rhode Island
Rhode Island did not send deputies.
South Carolina
John Rutledge
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney†
Charles Pinckney†
Pierce Butler

North Carolina
William. Blount†
Richard. Dobbs Spaight
Hugh Williamson
William R. Davie*†
Alexander Martin*†

Virginia
John Blair†
James Madison Jr. †
George Washington
George Mason*†
James McClurg*
Edmund J. Randolph*†
George Wythe*†

Pennsylvania
Benjamin Franklin
Thomas Mifflin
Robert Morris
George Clymer
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